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ABSTRACT 
Research in the field of network forensics is gradually expanding with the propensity to fully 
accommodate the tenacity to help in adjudicating, curbing and apprehending the exponential growth of 
cyber crimes. However, investigating cyber crime differs, depending on the perspective of investigation. 
There is therefore the need for a comprehensive model, containing relevant critical features required for a 
thorough investigation for each perspective, which can be adopted by investigators. This paper therefore 
presents the findings on the critical features for each perspective, as well as their characteristics. The 
paper also presents a review of existing frameworks on network forensics. Furthermore, the paper 
discussed an illustrative methodological process for each perspective encompassing the relevant critical 
features. These illustrations present a procedure for the thorough investigation in network forensics.  
Key words: Network Forensics Investigation, Model, Framework, Perspective, Military, Law 
Enforcement, Industries, Investigator. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Investigating how an incident occurred and who was involved, with respect to computer networks is 
usually referred to as network forensics. Various definition of network forensics has trailed the 
community of network forensics. In [2], a network forensics definition is given from the military 
perspective. Similarly, [3] presented a network forensics in industry paradigm. Moreover, the generally 
accepted description of network forensics is given in the digital forensics research workshop (DFRWS) 
2001
[1]
. However, in this study, we defined network forensics as the study of the underlying aim, action, 
source and result of an attack or any incident defined to contravene organization policy, or sets of 
command that can result in the compromise of a system such as botnets, and malwares. The inception of 
system compromise or network attack is usually designed on a silent and unnoticeable process, which is 
often overlooked by system experts, and consequently, progress into fully-fledge attack
 [4]
. Such 
techniques are developed over time, and usually, emerge within the scope of most academic syllabus
 [12, 13]
 
on engineering and computer science (example include digital forensics curriculum) 
[15]
. 
The academia thus plays a pivotal role
 [14]
 in the challenges rocking the digital world. Ironically, the 
mitigation of these challenges also resides within the confines of the academia. For effective 
investigation, a thorough understanding of the underlying perspective is undeniably required
 
to answer 
questions relating to ‘who will be involved’, ‘what are the requirements’, ‘what  resources are available 
and in what capacity’, and ‘to what end’ in a decisive, wholly and reliable conclusion. The academia 
initiates the background knowledge required for this requirement 
[14, 15]
. One could therefore think of the 
academia as the pivot upon which all aspect of network forensics is developed, without which, network 
forensics could stray frenzy
 [16]
.  
Network forensics can be viewed from various perspectives, but the prominent ones are the military, law 
enforcement, civil litigation, and the network security professional. These perspectives can however, be 
generally classified into three 
[1, 37]; ‘law enforcement’, ‘industries’ and ‘military’. The law enforcement 
perspective includes personnel in the legal technical institutions, policing system (example include first 
responder units), and government agencies. Industries refer to personnel in private sectors such as cyber 
security specialist, and organization devoted to the provision of forensic capabilities. The military 
perspective on the other hand refers to government military arsenal, military research institutes, as well as 
other military academic institution. Moreover, each of these perspectives shares similarity in varying 
degree of personnel, personnel qualification and responsibilities. Figure1 gives a descriptive analysis of 
the generic perspectives in network forensics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each of these personnel: researchers, developers, and investigators shown in Figure 1, though inter-
related in a loop-like relationship
 [1]
, constitute distinctly, the composition of network forensics. 
Researchers are personnel who undertake findings relevant to promote the existence of network forensics. 
Developers on the other hand are personnel who develop relevant softwares and hardware devices, 
needed for investigation. Investigators are personnel who engage in investigation. However, in 
application, each of these distinct components varies in their objective, methodology, as well as content 
scope. Scoping each of these perspectives to provide quantitative insight into the field of network 
forensics is therefore eminent, and requires urgent formulation, if network forensics discipline is to meet 
with its design attributes. Table 1 gives an overview of existing investigative framework for digital 
forensics.
Researcher  
 
Figure 1: Perspectives of network forensics. It embodies researchers, developers, and investigators but in varying degree of 
scope, relevance and priority. In network forensics generic perspective, the personnel are required in almost equal proportion. 
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Pollitt 
[36]
, 1995 Cyberspace model          x     x   x      x     
DFRWS
 [1]
 2001 Metal model        x x x  x     x x x          
Ashcroft 2001 First responders guide        x x x x                  
Reith &colleague
[41]
  Abstract model        x x x  x x    x x  x x        
Carrier &Spafford
[21]
  Event-based scene  investigation     x x x   x      x x            
Wei 
[26]
 Model for information security        x x     x        x     x  
Rowlingson
[30]
 Network forensics readiness       x   x x  x x  x    x x        
Beebe & Clark
[39]
 Hierarchical objective-based    x    x  x    x   x    x        
Ciardhuain
[20]
 Augmented waterfall 
architecture 
X x x     x x      x  x     x x x     
Forrester & Irwin
[38]
 Industrial organization model       x   x x x  x  x   x          
Rogers
[34]
 Field triage process model  x       x x     x             x 
Popovsky
[4]
  Network forensics readiness                             
Angelopoulou
[29]
  ID theft Investigation framework x         x     x              
Ray & colleague
[45]
  Domain-specific         x x        x       x    
Selamat & 
colleagues
[32]
 
Investigation framework 
mapping 
 x       x x x x x     x    x       
Peruma 
[44]
  Country-based investigation 
process 
 x x   x    x       x x    x x x     
Shakeel & colleague
[7]
  Law enforcement framework x         x x x   x      x        
Pilli, & colleagues
[28]
  Generic framework   x x x   x x x  x         x     x   
Hunton 
[40]
  Cybercrime investigation  x        x  x  x     x        x  
Yussof &colleagues
[42]
 Common phase investigation 
model 
         x  x x x x  x      x      
Agarwal & 
colleagues
[46]
  
Systematic investigation      x  x x x x x     x    x  x      
Ademu, & Activity-based x x      x         x    x x       
Table 1. Review of existing network/digital forensic framework 
colleagues
[47]
  
Ma, & colleagues 
[43]
 Data Fusion-based     x x   x        x    x        
Moreover, various models, and frameworks have been developed to provide insight into network 
forensics perspective as shown in Table 1. Though myriads of frameworks from different perspectives 
have trailed the community of network forensic, yet, there is no one framework that addresses the cogent 
features for military perspective, law enforcement perspective, and industrial perspective distinctively. 
Thus, this paper detailed exclusively, the critical features required for thorough network forensics 
investigation from law enforcement, military, and industries perspective. The rest of the paper is as 
follows; section 2 detailed existing frameworks and models for network forensics perspectives. Section 3 
elucidate on the analysis of network forensics perspectives cueing from the various personnel. In Section 
4, we present our illustrative methodological models for network forensics perspectives. Conclusion is 
given in section 5.  
 
2. EXISTING NETWORK FORENSICS PERSPECTIVE FRAMEWORK 
In [1], the first step on network forensics framework, relevant lexicon and research needs is presented. 
Academic researchers, military warfare, critical infrastructure protection and civil litigation paradigm 
were identified as the nucleus of network forensics. [2] discussed on the challenges militating against 
network forensics in military network environments. They identified information system of military 
organization as the primary victim of attack. Consequently, network forensics (in military investigation 
process paradigm), is described as the arsenal that provides a conclusive description of all cyber attack 
scenes with intent to restore critical information infrastructure, as well as to strengthen the confidence for 
investigative process. However, the use of network forensics simulation tools in military cyber warfare 
depends on specific requirement and desired aim of the organization
 [5,6]
. The military perspective of 
network forensics is usually targeted at a near-real-time investigation process 
[8]
, thus, network forensics 
in this paradigm primarily includes the need for physical location detection and a behavior-based 
algorithm research, to reduce the level of cyber anonymity 
[5]
. [6] further illustrated that military 
environment suffers most of the cyber attacks on critical infrastructures.  
[7] proposed a 3-phased law enforcement investigation framework from law enforcement perspective. 
They elucidated a review of the cyber law of the “Republic of Maldives”. Similarly, [6] researched on 
threat mitigation for cyber investigation. In law enforcement paradigm however, traditional crime 
solvability is not necessarily applicable to cyber crime investigation 
[6]
, but could be applicable to threat 
elimination through security hardening, and crime prosecution 
[18]
. Regardless of the level of 
technological improvement, investigation is human-centric (criminals, tool developers, researchers, 
prosecutors, investigators, and victims are human); hence a need for awareness maintenance 
[17]
 and 
training
 [4, 9]
 cannot be overemphasized. Furthermore, [10] expostulated that an efficient law-enforcement 
investigation process is one, which can facilitate relevance from contextualizing any cyber crime into a 
behavioral pattern, as well as quantifying the network technology for quick examination. Moreover, in 
[11] an extended cybercrime investigation model, for efficient cyber investigative practice in law 
enforcement community was proposed. In [38], a 5-phased industrial paradigm of investigation is 
presented. The phases include readiness, deployment, securing physical scene, securing digital scene and 
review phase. The readiness phase is the bedrock upon which investigation is vetted in conformance with 
stated organizational policy. At-scene investigative model in developed in [34]. Furthermore, timeliness 
in investigation was considered essentially important, through the introduction of investigation triage (a 
medical terminology for prioritization) and chronology timeline. An overview of existing frameworks in 
presented in Table 1. Additionally, Table 2 gives a substantive synopsis of the perspective in network 
forensics, while Table 3, gives an elucidatory description of the various features constituting network 
forensics frameworks. 
As shown in Table 2, the three perspectives of network forensics can be described distinctly with their 
characteristics, technicalities demand, critical focus, critical framework features and distinction.  
 
2.1. Characteristics of Network Forensics Perspectives 
Investigating network forensics differs in scope and objective from one perspective to the other. However, 
the scope and objective of an investigation usually depict its characteristic features. A brief description of 
the characteristics of the three identified perspectives are thus presented in this section 
 
Features Network forensics perspective 
Military Law enforcement Industries 
 
 
 
Characteristics 
Pro-active Post-mortem investigation Pro-active 
Reactive  
Off-line investigation 
Defensive 
Defensive Training and certification 
Near real time analysis Near real time analysis 
Target of attack Investigate the target of attack Target of attack, investigate target of 
attack 
Readily available resources   
Similarities Investigation: evidence identification, collection, fusion, analysis and documentation 
 
 
 
 
Distinction 
Usually near real time investigation Post mortem investigation Near real time investigation as well as 
post mortem investigation 
Heavy-tailed traffic type Lightweight traffic type (usually) Heavy tailed traffic type, and light weight 
traffic type 
Non-jurisdiction bound Requires jurisdiction justification Requires jurisdiction justification 
Inter-nations relationship Civil litigation Inter-city, and inter-nation relationship 
Low level of legal requirement High dependency on legal protocol High dependency on legal protocol 
24/7 monitoring and analysis, strictly 
coordinated, hierarchical investigation 
process 
Occasionally, and  case specific 
investigation process 
24/7 monitoring and analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
Technicalities 
demand 
Up-to-date technologies, updated soft wares Trusted soft ware, approved technological 
devices 
Up-to-date technology, enhanced 
software, and self-automated applications 
High level of technological sophistication 
required, 
 
Low level of technological sophistication 
required, 
High level of technological sophistication 
required, 
highly skilled and experience personnel 
 
highly experienced personnel highly skilled and highly trained 
personnel 
Large network environment, and variety of 
homogenous (manufacturer) network devices 
 
Relatively smaller network environment, 
and variety of heterogeneous 
(manufacturer) network devices 
Large network environment and variety 
of homogenous (manufacturer) network 
device 
Critical focus Research centric operation Investigation centric operation Developer and training centric 
Administrative investigation provision Litigation provision Administrative investigation provision 
Table 2: Overview of Network Forensics Perspectives 
Critical 
framework 
features 
 
 
Hypothesis, Event reconstruction, Analysis, 
Awareness, Readiness, Incident response, 
Approach strategy, Investigation initiation, 
Authorization, 
Modeling and behavior profiling, Risk 
assessment, protection, Analysis evaluation, 
Documentation, Reporting 
Chain of custody, collection, event 
reconstruction, documentation, analysis, 
preservation, examination, acquisition, 
identification, Digital crime scene, 
Physical crime scene, 
Documentation, analysis, preparation, 
Modeling and behavior prediction, 
Risk assessment, protection, 
Design, implementation, Reporting 
Deployment, examination, chain of 
custody  
2.1.1. The Military Perspective 
Network forensic investigation in the military looks beyond reactive and tactical cyber defense, to a 
proactive strategic cyber investigation. Military leaders have therefore begun the process of cyber 
investigation policy amongst which is the international military deterrence, the establishment of a 
Distance Early Warning Line (DEWL), and the capability to select from range of investigative arsenal 
[48]
. 
As shown in Table 2, the military perspective of network forensic investigation includes; 
 Proactive investigation: this type of investigation process involves the integration of expertise 
(expert hackers, script kiddies), motivation (financial gain, selfish aggrandizement, political 
achievement, personal/corporate/national vendetta, destruction), and attack vector
 [49, 51]
 of 
network event analysis procedure into modus operandi prediction models. Proactive 
investigations therefore tend to predict an event before its full incubation, by studying the 
underlying network traffic pattern, and intelligent correlation. This is essentially relevant for 
military investigation as it covers both near real time investigations, as well as ensure the 
readiness of resources. Additionally, such investigative paradigms are built upon the backdrop 
that most successful attack on military networks are heavily sponsored and could cause 
unredeemable catastrophic damage if successful. 
 Reactive and defensive investigation: defensive investigation[53] involves identifying network 
vulnerabilities, and implementing necessary remedy
[52]
 to forestall the exploitation of such 
loophole. Such investigation covers wide range of information security management system, and 
healthy network defense practice. It also involves preventing further incidence occurrence 
through traffic filtering and network isolation of infected host
 [52]
. On the other hand, a reactive 
investigation involves investigating network device and traffic with the aim of responding to 
breaches, either directly, or counteractively against the intrusion source. Such investigation is 
defined with accuracy in identifying intrusion source, environment and underlying circumstance, 
as well as detail logistical information; which are reliant on the level of reliance preparedness, 
situational awareness, and technical expertise
[14, 49]
. The DOD1998 Solar Sunrise
[49]
 is an example 
of such. Attacks such as the Moonlight Maze, Brazilian Power outage, and Titan Rain explicated 
in [54, 55] are fractions of the myriad range of threats/attacks at national infrastructure, military 
included. 
 
2.1.2 The Law Enforcement Perspective 
This perspective of investigation is carried out after an incident has occurred; a post-mortem scavenging 
process of network device and network related artifacts, to uncover facts substantial enough for criminal 
prosecution. Law enforcement investigation
[56]
 can also include the military but for the sake of this 
research, we refer to law enforcement as government agencies saddled with the judicial responsibility of 
investigating cyber related incident, so as to provide evidence otherwise termed hidden or lost, for cyber 
crime related cases. Therefore, the primary responsibility of this perspective is criminal apprehension. 
Moreover, deterrence becomes the consequence of the investigation. Being a post-mortem investigation, 
it is usually an off-line or passive network evidence collection, identification, analysis, documentation, 
and presentation of evidence contravening stipulated law, to court of competent jurisdiction. Additionally, 
it exhibits reasonable expectation of prejudice
[57]
 (a real, substantial and convincing grounds for 
investigation must exist before the commencement of investigation). 
 
2.1.3 Industries Perspective 
This perspective of investigation is relatively similar to that of military in areas of proactive, defensive 
investigation. As like military, it can also be the target of an attack. However more unique with this 
perspective is the training and certification capacity it also provides. Competent forensic investigators are 
usually forged from this perspective, before they are deployed or employed in other perspectives. The 
industries can also be described as an outsourcing unit for investigators, especially to law enforcement 
agencies. 
 
2.2 Distinction in Network Forensics Perspective 
The unique features that constitute network forensics for each of the perspective are presented in this 
section. 
 
2.2.1. Military perspective 
As identifies in table 2, network forensics in the military perspective is characterized by a stochastic 
heavy-tailed probability distribution (in [58], Fischer, and Fowler identified FTP transfer, page request, 
page reading time, session duration, session size, TCP connection, inter-arrival time of packet; to exhibit 
heavy tail distribution), which is due to real time or near real time analysis. Hence, most forensic tools 
developed in this perspective are heavy tail inclined. Moreover, investigation in this perspective functions 
autonomously of jurisdictional boundaries, and does not require any special court order to react, defend, 
or initiate investigation. However, monitoring, and event analysis, is strictly coordinated and usually 
follow a hierarchical model of clearance level evaluation such as the Bella Padula model 
[59]
.  
 
2.2.2 Law Enforcement Perspective 
This perspective is case specific, and adheres strictly to legal regulation. Since it has to do with evidence 
integrity, and admissibility in court of competent jurisdiction, law enforcement perspective requires 
jurisdictional justification, approved search and seizure warrant, well documented chain of custody note 
(see table 3), and transparent investigative process. The strict observance of legal protocol is a cardinal 
part of law investigation. 
 
 
 
2.2.3 Industries Perspective 
Investigation in this perspective is derives its uniqueness from both the military and the law enforcement. 
It is relatively similar to the military as well as law enforcement perspective in term of investigation type 
(near real time or offline), autonomous investigative process, inter-city and inter-national boundaries, and 
. However, this perspective can grow beyond the capacity of any military or law enforcement or both. 
Thus, an industrial perspective can be more complex to describe but maintains certain unique features 
nonetheless. 
The various technicalities demand for each perspectives as well as the critical focus are presented in Table 
2. However, the critical framework features (see Table 3) are further discussed in the proceeding section. 
 
3.  FEATURES OF NETWORK FORENSICS PERSPECTIVE 
The criticality of network forensic feature depends largely on the perspective, size, topology, and 
expertise of the investigator. The choice of feature to include in investigation, also describe the expected 
thoroughness of the investigation. In this section, we present the features that are critical for network 
forensic investigation for the three perspectives. 
Moreover, a concise descriptive definition of features used in network forensics is presented in Table 3. 
These features are derived from existing framework on digital forensics investigation. The term ‘Ff’ is an 
abbreviation for framework features. As noted in Table 3, some features are essential for all perspective 
irrespective of the crime scene involved. However, some are unique to certain perspective, which when 
included into the investigative process of other perspectives could result in higher overhead running cost 
(in term of resources and efficiency) and redundancy of service.  
 
Framework feature Description Perspective critical 
to 
Ff1-Chain of 
custody 
Chain of custody is a concept usually a written material that contains all processes carried out before, during 
and after an investigation on ‘what was done’, ‘why it was done’, ‘who did it’, and ‘when it was done’ [17, 19], a 
documentation proofing the integrity of evidence
 [18]
. 
All network 
forensics 
perspectives 
Ff 2-Hypothesis It is a supposition or proposition put forward by an investigator, as an explanation to an occurrence, to initiate 
an investigation based on evidence examination 
[20, 21]
. Hypothesis usually followed the SMART (specificity, 
measurability, attainability, realistic, and timeliness) ideology consideration.  
Industries, Military 
Ff 3-
Reconstruction 
Event reconstruction is the process of reconstructing the sequence of network traffic 
[22]
, from captured traffic 
accumulated, and or network device logs and other related devices, for establishing an occurrence and its 
supporting artifacts.
[21,23]
. The use of NFAT in the network forensics community today, has made this process 
easier, but still requires more consolidated and efficient technique, for undisputable evidence analysis process. 
All network 
forensics 
perspectives 
Ff 4-Authorization Investigation authorization involves the granting of legal permission to the effect of commencing investigation 
process. This could also involve the acquisition of a search and/or seizure warrant from a court of competent 
jurisdiction.
[16]
 
Military 
Ff 5-Incident 
closure 
This is the process of closing a particular network investigation exercise, usually after appropriate satisfactory 
status. It is preceded by a thorough review of the entire investigation process, well-articulated chain of custody, 
documentation and expert review consideration 
[24]
.  
Law enforcement 
Ff 6-Digital crime 
scene 
Securing the digital crime scene involves the practice of strict adherence to safe digital procedure for evidence 
acquisition, and preservation. It describes the ethics of first responders and computer emergency response team 
(CERT), to digital crime scene due to fragility and volatility of network forensics evidence 
[25]
. 
Law enforcement  
Ff 7-Physical crime 
scene 
Securing the physical crime scene involves the practice of due caution, and professionalism in safeguarding 
crime scene, and the use of appropriate signage. It generally describes the responsibility of first responders, and 
CERT 
[25]
  
Law enforcement 
Ff 8-Awareness It is usually associated with staff training on updated knowledge in network forensics [
17]
. Staffs include CERT, 
and organization IT staffs.  
Military, Industries 
Ff9-Readiness This is the act of being prepared for investigation at any given time. It combines section of organs of an 
organization for preparedness in the event of an emergency, as well as anticipated event of network intrusion 
breach. 
Industries, military 
Ff 10-Collection This is the process of collecting network traffic information for investigation purpose. It usually takes 
reasonable period, and in a pre-event-occurrence process. Due to network traffic volatility, evidence collection 
involves the combination of both network hardware and software composition
 [16, 26]
. 
All network 
forensics 
perspectives 
Ff 11-
Documentation 
This is the process of taking account of every process and activities carried out during investigation and the 
reason why it was done in such as manner 
[27]
. It is the heart of investigation, and contains, strictly articulated 
write-up of the entire investigation procedure. Documentation also serves as expert review, examiners’ note; 
All network 
forensics 
perspectives 
Table 3: Framework Feature Description 
source for future event investigation
 [17, 16, 25]
. 
Ff 12-Examination  This is the process of scavenging network traffic for clue or sample of relevant incriminating evidence. 
Devices to be examined include but not limited to, network devices. Examination could be static/manual 
process or automated process. 
Law enforcement 
Ff13-Analysis Analysis is sometimes categorized as examination. According to [27], it is the “process of interpreting 
extracted data, to ascertain the level of relevance or significance to ongoing investigation process”. Network 
forensics analysis tools (NFAT)
[28]
 are usually adopted for this phase (time framing analysis, data 
hiding/steganography analysis
[27]
) of network forensics. It is also the application of validated techniques to 
discovering or uncovering significant data 
[32]
 
All network 
forensics 
perspectives 
Ff 14-Evaluation Evaluation could be prior to evidence analysis, in this case, it reviews the facts required for examination; 
during evidence analysis, in this case, to determine the accuracy, thorough objectivity of the investigation, as 
well as conformity to stated priorities; or post event analysis, which involves the review of resultant artifacts, to 
proposed hypothesis, or other related undisputable facts. It is the process of deciding whether to accept or reject 
facts uncovered 
[32]
 
All network 
forensics 
perspectives 
 
Ff 15-Preservation This is the acts as well as the process of ensuring that the state of a particular network traffic evidence is not 
altered before, during or post event analysis. This is crucial to investigations requiring further analysis or other 
independent investigation. Preservation is a major factor for evidence admissibility in civil litigation. 
Law enforcement 
Ff 16-Returning of 
evidence 
This is the process of ensuring that all evidence collected during investigation are safely return to its supposed 
owner, and in the same or almost the same condition at the seizure and acquisition state. 
Law enforcement 
Ff 17-Investigation 
initiation 
This includes history from previously investigated cases. Initial investigation is the process of gathering 
relevant artifacts about a particular investigation process, building a predefined network traffic behavior 
database to ease (with respect to time, resources, and methodology) in investigation process. it marks the 
beginning or call for investigation 
Industries, Law 
enforcement 
Ff 18-Acquisition This is the process of gathering or gaining possession 
[31]
 to network traffic artifacts for or during investigation.  Law enforcement 
Ff 19-Deployment This involves putting in place respective forensics measure for proper conduct of investigation. According to 
[21, 30], deployment can be initiated after thorough evaluation of inputs from network security agent. 
Industries, Military 
Ff 20-Presentation This is the act of presenting authoritatively, the investigated facts, to relevant constituted authority. It is usually 
carried out as the last stage of network forensics investigation phases. 
Law enforcement 
Ff 21-Identification This is the process of pinpointing or locating relevant network forensics evidence from database of network 
traffic or from stream of traffic flow. An adequate and precise identification process goes a long way in 
influencing the amount of resources, the duration of investigation, and the weight of the evidence. 
All network 
forensics 
perspectives 
Ff 22-Decision This is the process of attributing certain parameters, artifacts of evidence and concluding on the result of the 
analysis from the investigation. This stage is the most critical phase of investigation, and it requires a thorough 
review of the entire process, expert counsel, and experience where necessary.  
All network 
forensics 
perspectives 
Ff 23-Approach This describes the designed process adopted for the investigation flow. A choice of which phase to carry out, Military  
strategy and in what sequence, and with what resources and in what manner. Approach strategy is a decision making 
process which usually involves expert input, in line with organization policies. 
Ff 24-Preparation This is the process of organizing the necessary network forensics requirement and process for investigation. It 
also involves the timely dissemination of investigation procedure and schedules to affected parties.
[32]
 
Industries, military 
Ff 25-
Transportation 
This is the process of moving collected network related evidences from one place to another (usually a network 
forensics laboratory) through a secure channel and procedure, in a well-documented order, and duly appended 
in chain of custody. 
Law enforcement  
Ff 26- Interaction This is the process of communicating relevant investigation process or result to constituted authority 
[32]
, with 
the view of sharing idea, developing better evidence decision process, and or demonstrates the level of 
investigation success. 
Military  
Ff 27- Storage This is the process of storing network related artifacts. This process usually involves well-established storage 
and retrieval mechanism, with a proper write/read blocker. 
All network 
forensics 
perspectives 
Ff 28- Search and 
seizure 
This is usually attributed to legal warrant obtained for the commencement of investigation. It involves the 
permission from constituted legal authority to carry out search on the victim or suspect system for relevant or 
incriminating evidence, and when necessary, seize the evidence source for thorough investigation 
[32]
. 
Law enforcement 
Ff 29- Admission This involves the taking-in of a particular network traffic data as part of the sources of network forensics 
evidence. Admitting evidence in network investigation process also involve the process of acknowledging and 
accepting an evidence as an authentic, and genuine. 
Law enforcement 
Ff 30- Defense This is the process of preventing alteration of network evidence, in order to maintain its integrity. Evidence 
defense also encompass the act of ensuring that a thorough explanatory analysis is provided to backup 
supposition and result of the analysis. 
Law enforcement, 
Military 
Ff 31- Design and 
implementation 
This is the process of establishing a workable network forensics investigation pattern and methodology for a 
particular investigation process. it usually stern from organization policies, and investigator’s experience from 
previously investigated scenes 
Military, industries 
Ff 32- Protection Is the process of preventing network traffic alteration before, during or after investigation. It is also the practice 
of ensuring integrity and validity of evidence for future use, or reference 
[32]
. 
All network 
forensics 
perspectives 
Ff 33- Risk 
assessment 
This is the act as well as process of taking into consideration the various factors involves for network forensics 
investigation so as to understand the risk at stake before initiating an investigation. Furthermore, risk 
assessment is the critical examination of organizations assets to identify assets that can justify legal redress 
when deliberately compromised 
[33]
. 
Industry 
Ff 34- Modeling 
and behavior 
prediction 
This process involves the mathematical or analytical procedure for forecasting the possibilities of event 
occurrence, to accelerate investigator’s decision–making process [34]. Network forensics modeling and behavior 
prediction is a complex process that, when properly carried out, can improve the efficiency of network analysis. 
Military, industry 
Ff 35- Data 
aggregation 
 
Data aggregation in network forensics is the process of clustering independent, but similar featured network 
traffic. This is executed in a coherent and methodological procedure to speed up investigating time. The 
process of significant features identification for data aggregation is given in [35]. 
All network 
forensics 
perspective. 
 
Ff 36 - Triage Network forensics triage is the process of sorting and prioritizing methodology, and investigative process, in 
order to increase the overall efficiency of the analysis, evaluation and decision making process. In [34], a field 
triage model was defined to catalyze the period required for investigation. 
Law enforcement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. ILLUSTRATION OF PERSPECTIVE METHODOLOGY 
In Table 2, a detailed overview of the characteristics, similarities, technicalities, and focus of each of the 
perspectives are described. In this section, we present the proposed models for each of the perspectives. 
 
Perspective Critical features Investigation process 
Military Ff 1 +  Ff 2 +  Ff 3 +  Ff 4 +  Ff 
8 +  Ff 9+ Ff 10 +  Ff 11 +  Ff 
13 +  Ff 14 +  Ff 19 +  Ff 21 +  
Ff 22 +  Ff 23 +  Ff 24 +  Ff 26 
+  Ff 27 +  Ff 30 +  Ff 31 +  Ff 
32 +  Ff 34 +  Ff 35+  Ff 36 
 Thorough understanding of the 
unique investigation scenarios in 
each perspective 
 Selection of features using a 
sequential methodology, such as 
appropriate for investigation 
development life cycle for each 
perspective 
 Acceptable definition and scope 
of each features/phases based on 
organization policy, 
electronic/multimedia/communic
ation Acts of the country, 
international laws   
 
Law 
enforcement 
Ff 1 +  Ff 3 +  Ff 5 +  Ff 6 +  Ff 
7 +  Ff 10 + Ff 11 +  Ff 12 +  Ff 
13 +  Ff 14 +  Ff 15 +  Ff 16 +  
Ff 17 + Ff 18 +  Ff 20 +  Ff 21 +  
Ff 22 +  Ff 25 +  Ff 27 +  Ff 28 
+  Ff 29 +  Ff 30 +  Ff 32 +  Ff 
35 +  Ff 36 
Industries Ff 1 +  Ff 2 +  Ff 3 +  Ff 8 +  Ff 
9 +  Ff 10 + Ff 11 +  Ff 13 +  Ff 
14 +  Ff 17 +  Ff 19 +  Ff 21 +  
Ff 22 +  Ff 24 +  Ff 27 +  Ff 31 
+  Ff 32 +  Ff 33 +  Ff 34 +  Ff 
35+  Ff 36 
 
 
4.1 Military perspective illustration 
The military perspective highlighted in Table 2 reveals that network forensics in this paradigm requires an 
updated real-time validation. However, before any action can be taken from a real-time analysis, thorough 
investigation must be presented in manner consistent with the military combative methodology. Hence, in 
table 4, detailed critical feature for in-depth investigation is presented. Features such as Ff1, Ff11, and Ff8 
are primarily critical for decision defense in military paradigm of investigation; hence, they cut across the 
entire phases of investigation procedure presented in figure 2. 
Table 4: Critical Features for Network Forensics perspectives 
 
  
Figure 2 is a 19-phase (with additional 3-phase attached to each phases) investigation illustration for 
network forensics. The MP1 procedure can be further translated into the following sequential procedure. 
 Ff2,+ Ff4 + Ff10[(Ff14+ Ff35)], +(Ff12+Ff23)], +Ff13, +[Ff19+Ff22], +Ff26,+ Ff31(Ff 32+ Ff 
30) + Ff34 + Ff        …(1) 
 Ff2 + Ff21 + Ff27 + Ff3 + Ff23 + Ff13 (Ff35 + Ff14)+ [Ff19 + Ff22] + Ff26 + Ff31(Ff32 + Ff30) 
+ Ff34 + Ff2         …(2)  
 Ff2 + Ff24 +[ Ff30 +( Ff23 + Ff13 +( Ff19 + Ff22) + Ff26 + Ff32] + Ff31 + Ff34 + Ff2  
          …(3) 
In contrast to other existing model, this illustration adopts a recursive iteration procedure that can help to 
reduce possibilities of human error, as well as overlooked facts. Additionally, it reduces investigation 
overhead accumulated due to features clustered phases.  
 
4.2 Law Enforcement Perspective Illustration 
In Table 2, law enforcement paradigm in network forensics investigation process is characterized by post 
event occurrence. Thus, an in-depth postmortem in scavenging network devices and stored databases is 
required for a network forensics investigation. Moreover, investigation procedure differs from one crime 
scene to another, and usually depends on the discretion of the investigator. Hence, Figure 3 depicts an 
illustrative methodology for network forensic investigation.   
Figure 2: Network forensics military investigative perspective illustration.  
 
  This illustration involves a 23-phase investigative procedure, which are further translated into the 
following: 
 Ff28+ Ff17+[ Ff6+ Ff7+( Ff8+ Ff10)]+ Ff25+ [Ff27+ Ff15]+Ff3+Ff21 + Ff12 +( Ff13+ Ff35)+ 
Ff36+ Ff14+ Ff22+ Ff30+ Ff20+ Ff16+ Ff5     …(4) 
 Ff29+ Ff17+[ Ff6+ Ff7+( Ff8+ Ff10)]+ Ff25+ [Ff27+ Ff15]+Ff3+Ff21 + Ff12 +( Ff13+ Ff35)+ 
Ff36+ Ff14+Ff22+ Ff30+ Ff20+ Ff16+ Ff5     …(5) 
Irrespective of the procedure of choice, this example can be seen as a non-recursive investigative process. 
The translated procedure in ‘1’ and ‘2’ above terminates on same feature (Ff36+ Ff14+Ff22+ Ff30+ 
Ff20+ Ff16+ Ff5), further indicating that the law enforcement paradigm of investigation can be termed a 
project-like investigation. 
 
4.3 Industry perspective Illustration  
Figure 4, depicts an investigative illustration for industries. However, depending on the organizational 
management policy, some features could be skipped. It involves a 18-phase (with additional two for each 
phases) forensics procedure, which can be translated as  
 
Figure 4: An industry perspective illustration of network forensics investigation 
 Ff8+ Ff17+ Ff24+[ Ff32+( Ff2+ Ff21+ Ff19)]+ Ff10(Ff32)+[ Ff3(Ff14+ Ff15)+ Ff27]+ Ff13+ 
Ff22          …(6) 
 Ff8+ Ff17+ Ff24+ Ff2+ Ff21+[ Ff10(Ff19)] + Ff10(Ff32)+ Ff27+ Ff31+[ Ff34(Ff33)]+ Ff8 
          …(7) 
 Ff8+ Ff9+ Ff2+ Ff21+[ Ff19+Ff10(Ff32)]+ Ff27+ Ff31+[ Ff34(Ff33)]+ Ff8 …(8) 
 Ff8+ Ff9+ Ff2+ Ff21+[ Ff19+ Ff10(Ff32)]+ [ Ff3(Ff14+ Ff15)+ Ff27]+ Ff13+ Ff22 ...(9) 
Each of the above translation distinctly forms a pattern thorough enough for investigation. However, the 
combination of the features defined in IWP can yield a more thorough investigation result.  
 
5. DISCUSSION 
Each of the illustrations can be further translated into the highlighted dimension in equation 1 to 9. In 
Figure 2, ‘IWP’ comprises the ‘IP’ combined with the Ff1, Ff11 and Ff8. The Ff8 feature is considered 
critical due to the need for constant awareness of latest attack pattern, evolutionary network malwares, 
and up-to-dated network defense arsenal. Ff1 feature is a critical feature for all network forensics 
procedure as its forms the reservoir for knowledge on evidence detail at every event and process carried 
on before, during, and after investigation. Similarly, Ff11, serves as the knowledge deposit for event 
procedure, as well as resource for proper investigation evaluation, and expert witness note. The 
integration of critical features Ff1, Ff11 and Ff8 into the translated procedures in equations 1, 2 and 3, 
provide investigators vintage view of the investigation. Additionally, in Figure 3 ‘LEWP’ represents the 
entire investigation procedure for the model. Ff1 and Ff11 features are integrated in every step in the 
model. Moreover, in Figure 4 ‘IWP’ integrates Ff1, and Ff11 into each step in the investigative model.  
With this illustration, network forensics can thoroughly scavenge network devices in a methodological 
procedure. The GCFIM model proposed in [42] by Yussof, Ismail and Hassan, (2011), identified 
presentation, preservation, planning, identification, examination, collection and analysis with value of 7, 
4, 3, 6, 5, 6, 7 respectively, as the common features for investigation from a survey of 14 frameworks. 
However, they failed to identify any specific perspective of application of their 5-phased framework. 
Moreover, with description and analysis from this research a thorough analysis and choice of feature 
deemed critical to the relevant investigation process can be selected/adopted. Furthermore, a logical 
sequential and or iterative methodological principle can be applied.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we discussed the existing network forensics frameworks. Special attention was directed 
towards the three major perspectives (as identified in most research works, particularly, [1], & [37]) of 
network forensics. Furthermore, we identified the critical features required for thorough investigation, and 
we synthesize extensively, the various perspective of network forensics. Based on the identified features, 
we demonstrated illustrative procedures that can be used to integrate these critical features for each 
perspective. 
We hope to conduct extensive experimental process on these illustrations, in our research on network 
forensics analysis and experimental works on insider misuse prevention. Additionally, we hope to fully 
integrate these illustrations into an automated investigative process useful to the cyber policing 
community, as well as research community, thus limiting investigators prerogative in investigation 
process. 
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